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Abstract 
Luck egalitarians equalize the outcome enjoyed by people who exemplify the 
same degree of distributive desert by removing the influence of luck.  They also try to 
calibrate differential rewards according to the pattern of distributive desert.  This 
entails that they have to decide upon, among other things, the rate of reward, i.e., a 
principled way of distributing rewards to groups exercising different degrees of the 
relevant desert.  However, the problem of the choice of reward principle is a relatively 
and undeservedly neglected issue among luck egalitarians.  The main goal of this paper 
is to highlight the importance and difficulty of this problem, and to elaborate upon G. A. 
Cohen's community-oriented response to it.  In the last section, I provide a taxonomy 
of distributive pluralism, contrasting Cohen’s view with other (not so genuine) pluralisms 
- especially with all-things-considered varieties - while trying to motivate readers to 
adopt the more robust form of pluralism. 
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1. Cohen’s Proposal for the Luck Egalitarian Job Description 
 
People have many intuitions regarding equality.  Of these, I consider two to be the 
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bedrock upon which an egalitarian theory of distributive justice can be built.  The first is that 
strict or flat equality cannot serve as a fundamental distributive norm.  One might end up with 
strict egalitarianism after having examined every available justification for inequality and having 
found it unconvincing.  But strict equality, come what may, is not a usual candidate for a basic 
distributive norm.  In theory and in practice, we aim at giving to individuals according to some 
criterion: giving the same amount to people who have satisfied the designated criterion to the 
same extent. 
Another entrenched (normative and linguistic) intuition is that any distributive 
principle allowing for a large (or indefinitely large) gap between individual shares ought not to be 
called egalitarian.  This idea suggests that the “egalitarian” character of a distributive principle 
comes in degrees.  It also places a constraint upon the distributive criterion of a principle for the 
latter to be an egalitarian principle: A principle is egalitarian to the extent that the nature of its 
distributive criterion and the way it adjusts the final outcome according to its criterion exhibit 
intrinsic (i.e. non-instrumental) pressure toward gap-reduction.  How much and in how many 
cases a theory of distributive justice presents in-principle objections and resistance to unequal 
share determines its egalitarian character. 
Based on these two intuitions, I propose that any reasonable egalitarianism should meet 
two conditions.  First, it must pursue “equality according to X” as a matter of comparative 
fairness.  Second, as a result of this pursuit, the final gap between individual shares should be 
reduced compared to other distributive schemes.  The second condition, in turn, can be boiled 
down to two questions: First, how much individual difference results from applying its 
distributive criterion?  According to our first condition, in building an egalitarian theory we 
need a criterion (X), and since such a theory will allow differential rewards for people exhibiting 
differential degrees of X, the range of individual differences permitted by the theory is crucial to 
the final gap between individual shares.  Second, the theory must provide itself with a reward 
system: how much distance in reward would be appropriate for the groups displaying differential 
degrees of X?  The degree of individual differences in X, and the rate of reward between 
X-classes determine the egalitarian credentials of X-egalitarianism. 
Paying much heed to the above-mentioned egalitarian intuitions and conditions, a 
number of philosophers and economists have been advocating “luck egalitarianism,” whose two 
main concerns are: (1) that one’s deserved economic share should not be influenced by 
circumstantial factors beyond one’s control and choice (such as his natural talents, skill, sex, or 
his parents’ educational level); (2) that we need to take account of responsible choice (such as 
prudential effort or morally worthy activity) in determining individual shares.  In other words, 
according to luck egalitarianism, distributive justice consists of compensation for involuntary 
disadvantages and reward for responsible choice and action.1  Luck egalitarians pick out certain 
aspects of responsible choice and action as “distributive desert”, and equalize the outcome 
                                                     
1 G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, John Roemer, Ronald Dworkin are usually considered the main contributors in 
the formation of luck egalitarianism. 
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enjoyed by people who exemplify the same degree of distributive desert by removing the 
influence of luck.  They also try to calibrate differential rewards according to the pattern of 
distributive desert.2  This characterization of luck egalitarianism immediately suggests that 
anyone who subscribes to it should take three tasks upon himself.  He has to clarify, first, what 
is to be equalized among individuals in the same desert-class (“the currency of egalitarian 
justice”);3 second, the nature of distributive desert; and, third, the rate of reward, i.e., a 
principled way of distributing rewards to groups exercising different degrees of the relevant 
desert. 
G. A. Cohen, one of the philosophers who initiated the recent discussion of luck 
egalitarianism, puts forward proposals for each of the above three issues.  The main goal of this 
paper is to highlight the importance and difficulty of the problem of the choice of reward 
principle, and elaborate upon Cohen's response to it.  There are two reasons why I devote this 
space to the reward problem rather than to other two issues.  First, I accept the main thrust of 
Cohen’s views on the first two issues.  On the currency, his proposal is to zero in on opportunity 
for or access to welfare.  And, according to Cohen’s “labor-burden-adjusted equality,” the 
relevant part of one’s responsible choice that determines his deserved share is prudential effort 
(rather than moral worthiness).  Thus, the relevant egalitarian currency is opportunity for or 
access to welfare when we consider the condition of people before they make their choice 
regarding prudential effort.  After they make this choice, what is to be equalized among 
individuals in the same effort-class is welfare.  I simply align myself with the welfarist and 
prudential version of luck egalitarianism in this paper.4  However, the main reason for my 
choice of the topic of this paper is that the problem of the reward principle, that is, the justified 
rate of differential rewards for different effort-classes, is a relatively and undeservedly neglected 
issue among luck egalitarians. 
                                                     
2 Desert-oriented equality is the goal at the level of the principle of justice.  In reality, we might opt for giving 
priority to the worst-off rather than equality in each and every desert-class (and as a result, the gap between 
individuals might be increased when that gap is “necessary” for raising the condition of the worst-off), either because 
equality is sometimes infeasible, or it has no chance of commanding a large (political and popular) consensus, or we 
have to take other distributive ideals (welfare or basic needs-satisfaction) into consideration.  By virtue of feasibility, 
acceptability, and plural concerns in distribution, a final “optimal” or “legitimate” policy may break away from the 
egalitarian mandate.  This paper discusses Cohen’s rationale for the distinction between justice and legitimacy in 
the last section.  I believe that underscoring the importance of this distinction, and awakening us to the normative 
cost and undesirability of keeping distributive justice within the bounds of what is practical and feasible (given the 
status quo social ethos and institutional setting), are two of Cohen’s most enduring legacies. 
3 Welfare and resources have been two main answers to “equality of what?”  Opportunity for welfare emerged as a 
third contender for the egalitarian currency.  For complexities in each proposed currency and relations among 
them, see Cohen (1989). 
4 Cohen’s official term for the egalitarian currency is ‘access to advantage.’  Cohen includes welfare and resources 
in his notion of advantage, since he believes that sometimes a person’s resources deficit constitutes a legitimate 
ground for egalitarian compensation, even though his welfare level is not low compared to others.  See Cohen 
(1989, 15).  For Cohen’s labor-burden equality, see Cohen (2000, 130) and Cohen (2008, 56ff, 103ff). 
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Deciding upon the appropriate luck egalitarian reward principle presents an especially 
knotty problem in that, although compensation and reward must be considered in tandem, there 
is no reward principle that is uniquely dictated by luck egalitarian compensation.  A reward 
principle must be part of the luck egalitarian project, but it may well be an additional component 
not directly informed by the compensation principle.  This fact has not been properly 
appreciated by luck egalitarians, and has attracted insufficient discussion in recent debates.  In 
his later writings,5 Cohen sketched out an idea of community as an equality-friendly principle of 
reward.  In the next section, I try to develop this idea, and bolster its egalitarian credentials both 
by reference to what Cohen has to say about community generally, and by contrast with other 
proposals which stand in greater opposition to luck egalitarianism. 6   While the 
community-based reward principle is an addition to the luck egalitarian ideal of compensation, it 
nevertheless bears significant affinity with it.  Or, so I argue. 
The conclusion from section 2 implies that Cohenian distributive justice has two 
components: luck egalitarian compensation for circumstantial disadvantages and the 
community-based rate of reward.  Distributive justice understood in this way represents a 
distributive ideal.  There are other ideals, such as welfare, need, and Pareto efficiency.  
Someone might want to widen the scope of distributive justice further, thereby identifying the 
latter with the best harmonious combination of all the distributively relevant ideals.  Cohen 
belongs to the group of luck egalitarians who maintain a robust pluralistic stance, with all its 
merits and predicaments.  In section 3, I provide a taxonomy of distributive pluralism, 
contrasting Cohen’s view with other (not so genuine) pluralisms -- especially with 
all-things-considered varieties -- while trying to motivate readers to adopt Cohen’s form of 
pluralism, according to which ideals other than luck egalitarian compensation and 
community-based reward are regarded as distributively relevant, but non-justice ideals. 
Since I do not defend every (core) claim that Cohen makes in distributive matters, it is 
obvious that my discussion of his reward principle and pluralism constitutes only a “partial” 
defense of his view.  However, there are two further senses in which my defense is only 
“partial.”  First, my discussion is concerned with largely internal affairs.  My focus is usually 
on debates among those who are, broadly speaking, (luck) egalitarians; I do not discuss 
inegalitarian criticisms of Cohen.  Lastly, on some occasions I part ways with (customary 
interpretations of) some aspects of Cohen’s considered view, introducing an amendment or 
supporting a particular interpretation of his view where it is susceptible to various renderings. 
                                                     
5 Notably Cohen (2009b). 
6 Cohen’s view is more egalitarian than other (luck egalitarian) positions in terms of two egalitarian conditions 
suggested earlier: First, in Cohen’s view, smaller individual differences will be countenanced than other views which 
include more elements in the notion of distributive desert, e.g. preferences and character one does not choose.  
Second, his community reward principle puts additional pressure on narrowing the gap between differential 
effort-classes.  For a recent statement of Dworkin’s preference-based view of responsibility and its distributive 
implication, see his (2011, 241-48, and 358-62). 
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2. Cohen’s Community as an Egalitarian Reward Principle 
 
2.1 A conundrum for luck egalitarians concerning the reward principle 
Suppose that we have a set of all the feasible allocations of resources to individuals.  If 
prudential luck egalitarians are invited to evaluate these allocations from the point of view of 
distributive justice, how should they proceed in this evaluation?  Their compensation principle 
entails an unambiguous evaluative criterion: the smaller the gap (in the proper egalitarian 
currency) among persons sharing the same effort, the more ideal the allocation.  This means 
that the distributive impact of circumstantial factors is minimized.  But, how about the 
inequalities among different effort-classes?  What should be the luck egalitarian verdict 
regarding those inequalities?  In other words, what is the shape of a distinctively luck egalitarian 
reward principle whose task is to determine the rate of reward for differential exercise of 
prudential effort? 
In this section I argue that the idea of luck egalitarianism as such — compensation for 
involuntary disadvantage and respect for responsible choice — does not by itself provide a 
definite principle of reward. I present two reasons why there is no easy and obvious manner in 
which a reward principle can be constructed that is distinctively luck egalitarian.  We need an 
additional principle to formulate the rate of reward for different effort-classes.  On the other 
hand, it does not seem to be the case that luck egalitarians should be completely indifferent as to 
the selection of a reward principle, and/or compelled to think that any candidate is equally good.  
The fact that luck egalitarianism by itself is not sufficient to furnish a reward principle, and yet, 
selection of the latter cannot be totally outside its concern and task, is the source of its 
predicament.   
 
1. No absolute share for each effort-class:  Someone may entertain the idea that there is an 
“absolute” level of reward for everyone based on his desert level.  One example of this approach 
is illustrated by Shelly Kagan’s notion of noncomparative desert.  Kagan’s “peak” refers to the 
point in one’s welfare that he noncomparatively deserves, such that the value of his welfare from 
the standpoint of desert reaches its highest level at this point and would decrease before and after 
this point.7  If there were such an absolute share for each and every effort-class, the problem of 
rate of reward for effort would be automatically solved.  I assume, however, that it is extremely 
difficult to mobilize plausible support for “peaks,” that is, the idea that there is a certain amount 
of reward to be absolutely paired with each particular degree of prudential effort expended.  The 
guiding motive in Kagan’s analysis of desert is given by the notion of moral worth, and the 
                                                     
7 See Kagan (1999).  Since in his view the central concern is to grant these absolute shares to as many people as 
possible, considerations of comparative fairness and equality are simply not part of the job of the distributive account 
based on his view.  However, Kagan’s assertion that even in comparative desert, equality and desert considerations 
frequently diverge is also based on the idea of peak. 
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contrast between saints and sinners.  Perhaps in the case of moral desert and especially for this 
extreme contrast-class, there might be room for the idea of absolute and noncomparative share.8  
However, when one’s concern is to find an allocation rule according to prudential desert/effort, 
the idea of peak and its concomitant notion of absolute and noncomparative share are simply 
non-starters.  One’s share shall be determined not only by the level of his prudential effort but 
also by those of others (and, of course, by the overall size of the pie to be distributed at the 
moment).  Also, from the standpoint of prudential luck egalitarianism which prizes equality as 
a matter of comparative fairness, what is valuable - that is, what contributes to the value of the 
distributive state of affairs - is not that a person receives a particular amount of distributandum, 
but how the pattern of the latter corresponds to that of the effort. 
 
2. No “natural” proportionality: Although the most natural way to elucidate the aforementioned 
notion of correspondence between effort and reward patterns seems to be to adopt the 
proportionality view (the view that reward should be given in proportion to effort), this will not 
serve the purpose of luck egalitarianism.  There are a number of reasons for this conclusion.  
First, it sometimes appears that talking about the rate of prudential effort does not even make 
sense, due to its often qualitative aspects.  The number of hours of labor might not be an 
adequate measure of the quality of labor-related burdens that people take upon themselves 
through responsible choice.  Even when it makes sense to talk about exercising greater or lesser 
effort, in many cases there is not a definite answer to the question, “How much greater is A’s 
effort than B’s?”  Finally, suppose that we manage to arrive at a certain (cardinal) measure of 
effort, and assign some magnitude to each person on account of his effort.  Mapping this 
distribution of effort to the profile of outcome can still be accomplished in several ways.  When 
labor hours are taken as the measure of effort, one way of “proportionally” rewarding effort is to 
use the logarithm of hours instead of (non-logarithmic) hours as the mapping function.  Just as 
the Celsius and Fahrenheit scales are both perfectly “proportional” measures of the same 
phenomena — the temperature of the physical object — the prudential activity of people can be 
translated into a reward profile in many different ways, depending upon the choice of 
(comparison) unit and mapping function. The upshot is that even when one accepts the general 
tenet of respecting effort, there is simply no natural or unique answer to the question, how to 
correlate specific effort difference and difference in reward.  The pertinent lesson to be drawn 
from the above considerations, I submit, is that we need to be aware of the multiple functions in 
which monotonicity obtains — that is, the existence of multiple ways in which a greater reward is 
always given for more effort — and recognize that luck egalitarianism alone does not provide 
sufficient guidance for making a choice among them. 
 
Thus, luck egalitarians have the challenging task of addressing the rate-of-reward issue 
within the spirit of their egalitarianism: Although luck egalitarianism per se does not discriminate 
                                                     
8 For the criticism of Kagan and the idea of peak even on this score, see Arneson (2007, 278-84). 
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among reward principles, it may be the case that some of those principles and luck egalitarianism 
support one another, or have common normative grounds.  Luck egalitarians ought to carry out 
a search for such a reward principle. 
 
2.2 Luck egalitarian choice with respect to the reward principle 
In addition to the views that rely on “absolute” reward or “natural” proportionality, 
which we have found inadequate, I can think of three more strategies for dealing with the reward 
problem.  First, utilitarians would say that the correct rate of reward is the one that maximizes 
the sum total of distribuendum.  Second, the idea of liberal reward implies that once 
compensation for unfortunate circumstances has been made, we must maintain a 
“no-intervention” policy.  Finally, according to the institutional approach, the rate of reward 
and legitimate gaps between different responsibility groups must be decided by the norm which 
best reflects the package of social concerns and desiderata. 9   These views are formally 
compatible with prudential luck egalitarian compensation.  In other words, if they come into 
play after equality within each effort-class obtains (or is pursued as far as possible), and their 
reward systems respect the ordinal structure of effort -- where rewards are not distributed in 
disproportion to the degree of effort luck egalitarians can appeal to each of those views as a 
supplementary principle to their compensatory project.  With the idea of “natural” 
proportionality left out of consideration, there is no formal reason for any of them to be ruled 
out at the outset. 
This formal compatibility notwithstanding, my conjecture is that prudential luck 
egalitarians would not, in the end, rely on these views.  The institutional approach simply is a 
reminder that we need an additional reward principle: what social fairness implies and which 
institution best serves it are what distributive justice is about, and therefore, this solution 
amounts to a place-holder for a complete theory.  However, the institutional view could take the 
more concrete Rawlsian form informed by the ideal of equal citizenship.10  The idea seems to be 
that gaps between desert-classes should be regulated in order to secure equal political and civil 
                                                     
9 Teun Dekker proposes an institutional approach, while Serena Olsaretti sides with a proportionality constraint on 
reward gaps. See Dekker (2009, 116-18) and Dekker (2010, 224-27); Olsaretti (2009, 184).  For the liberal 
(“no-intervention”) view, see Fleurbaey (2008, 29-31, 113, 265-67) and Dworkin (2011, ch. 16).  As is well-known, 
even in a laissez-faire economy the state provides and enforces certain measures of legal intervention (such as the 
preservation of property relations), which affect distribution.  Thus, the so-called “no-intervention” reward 
principle must be understood as a policy of minimization of the state’s role in distribution (after initial luck 
egalitarian compensation).  I should mention that Fleurbaey seems to be of two minds when it comes to the liberal 
reward principle vs. more robust (ex post) compensation (see ibid. 32-33, and ch. 10).  My impression is that in the 
end, the liberal mind in Fleurbaey has the best of his egalitarian side.  Yet, he is fully aware of the many aspects of 
the “interplay” between circumstantial and responsibility characteristics. 
10 Pablo Gilabert makes a proposal to the effect that “a concern for status equality and the condition of self-respect” 
(alongside securing “a minimal threshold of advantage”) grounds plausible limits on the inequalities condoned by 
luck egalitarian compensation.  See Gilabert (2012, 111ff). 
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status for every member of a society.11  I offer two observations concerning its relevance to the 
reward problem: First, since Rawlsian equal citizenship is not the same as Cohenian community 
— for this see below — a Rawlsian reward principle is likely to advocate a certain minimum or 
threshold (economic) level for ensuring equal political and civil status.  Second, beyond that 
level, the Rawlsian approach would mandate (out of Rawlsian reciprocity) the maximum 
improvement of the condition of the lowest desert-class, rather than gap-reduction across a large 
or entire segment of desert-classes.   
I will not discuss general normative problems of utilitarian and liberal reward systems.  
I simply would like to draw attention to the fact that maximization of overall outcome and 
minimization of state intervention are such sweeping goals that they tend to go beyond the 
confines of a supplementary reward principle.  Utilitarians and libertarians, even when they are 
summoned to resolve the problem of differential rewards for different effort-classes, would tend 
to impose their own visions on the compensation component of distribution and disrupt the 
ordinal structure of effort.  When the goal is to maximize utility or minimize the role of the 
state, why stop just at differential rewards for effort-classes?  Why, indeed, observe the ideal of 
luck-neutralization and equality according to prudential effort, in the first place?  (The 
aspiration to be comprehensive is not just a theoretical tendency of utilitarianism and 
libertarianism; we observe that policy-makers of both stripes usually advocate a universal 
application of their tenets.)  For this reason, I believe that an amicable partnership between luck 
egalitarianism and these reward principles is unlikely.   
Among luck egalitarians, I consider G. A. Cohen to be the first person who explicitly 
acknowledged the need to combine luck egalitarian compensation with an additional reward 
principle.  Even after this compensation has been achieved, according to Cohen, “the question 
remains, how large is this inequality [justified by differential exercise of effort] likely to be?”12  
                                                     
11 The broadly Rawlsian ideal of democratic equality in economic distribution governs not just the reward problem.  
Its central tenet is that economic equality ought to be promoted to the extent, and basically for the reason, that it is 
necessary for a society of citizens with equal political and civil liberties.  From this perspective, many Rawlsians 
admit that the promotion of economic equality (as gap-reduction) falls within the jurisdiction of Rawls’s liberty 
principle: “[T]the first principle may place its own limits on economic inequality, and they may be more severe than 
the difference principle’s limits.” (Estlund, 1998m 110: Emphasis added.)  See also, Daniels (2003, 262-63) and 
Smith (1998, 17ff).  In effect, this is essentially Rawls’s response to the possibility of an ever-widening economic gap.  
See Rawls (1999, 136-37) and Rawls (2001, 67-68).  One of the core features of Cohen’s egalitarianism is that the 
ideal of removing the influence of luck and rewarding according to prudential effort should exert its own egalitarian 
normative force, independently of its connection with political and civil equality.  For the question of distributive 
justice can survive the significant achievement of political and civil equality, and there might be a mismatch between 
political and economic equality in the sense that the progress in the former is accomplished while there is a visible 
setback to the latter.  (Indeed, this seems to be a reasonable description of the state of affairs in the USA for the last 
four decades.) 
12 Cohen (2009b, 29).  (From now on parenthetical page numbers in the paper refer to pages in this book.)  Note 
that an earlier version of this book was published in article format in 2001, which predates all writers on the reward 
problem mentioned in previous footnotes.  When Cohen considers justice (that is, luck-egalitarian-compensation) 
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He also proposes a reward principle in this regard: “Although inequalities [of this type] are not 
condemned by justice, they are nevertheless repugnant to socialists, when they obtain on a 
sufficiently large scale, because they then contradict community: community is put under strain 
when large inequalities obtain.” (p. 34)13  Moreover, he suggests that community and equality 
each “supported the other, and each was strengthened by the fact that it was supported by the 
other.”14  Unfortunately, we cannot hear more about the nature, role and distributive relevance 
of the community principle from Cohen (because of his untimely death).  Here, I try to depict 
major features of Cohen’s notions of community and community ethos, as well as his 
community-based reward principle, and point to some observations that may indicate the 
presence of a connection between prudential luck egalitarianism and community which is more 
intimate than mere formal compatibility. 
 
2.3 Features of Cohen’s community and egalitarian ethos 
My observation is based on what Cohen had to say about community in scattered places.  
Cohenian community has four notable features.  (Admittedly, these features are not equally 
relevant to the reward problem in a direct manner.  They indicate, however, how community 
can have the relationship of mutual support with equality.)  First, in the community, my service 
and contribution are not conditional upon what I get out of this service; I respond to others’ 
needs.  Yet, if my desire and expectation to serve others while being served by them are satisfied, 
this is the best condition from the community perspective.  Such a state is what Cohen calls “a 
communal form of reciprocity” (p. 38).  In this type of human relationship, the ideal state of 
affairs is mutual serving, but my serving is not motivated by or conditional upon your 
reciprocation.  Since Cohen believes that communal reciprocity is an intrinsically desirable 
form of human relationship, he considers it legitimate to mobilize that idea for the purpose of 
placing limits on the inequality of outcome sanctioned by luck egalitarian compensation.15 
Second, community tends to be undermined by unregulated markets.  On textual 
grounds, it seems to be Cohen’s considered opinion that there is an essential conflict between 
community and markets in any form: He asserts that “[e]very market, even socialist market, is a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
- compatible inequalities caused by differential prudential choice and effort, his focus is on regrettable choice, a case 
in which the agent retrospectively regrets having exerted a low degree of effort and having landed in a low-level 
position of welfare.  In the earlier article version, he only mentioned “differential exercise of effort” (Cohen 2001, 
64).  I believe that retrospective regret on the agent’s part is not crucial in considering which inequalities deserve 
alleviation by an adequate reward principle. 
13 Recently, Roemer has also claimed that luck egalitarianism as such comprises only the principle of compensation, 
and endorsed community as a candidate for an additional principle that will imply some constraint on the reward to 
effort.  See Roemer (2012, 179). 
14 Cohen (1994, 214). 
15 Cohen’s communal reciprocity is akin to what Michael Taylor calls “generalized reciprocity,” in that it aspires to 
mutual benefit, but is not conditional upon reciprocation.  Taylor argues that the range of communal interaction 
corresponds to the segment of the spectrum lying “between balanced [conditional] reciprocity and generalized 
reciprocity, including the latter pole but not the former.”  See Taylor (1982, 30). 
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form of predation,” (82) operating on and reinforcing the motives of greed and fear. (pp. 40ff, 
74-75)16  The essential conflict thesis is a major issue, partly because we do not yet know 
whether it is possible to preserve the allocational and informational roles of markets without 
their (now dominant) distributive and motivational consequences.  Here, I just register two 
themes which could be described as being congenial to Cohen: First, there is no doubt that 
existing markets crucially depend on — and build up — profit motives, commodification, and 
unequal enjoyment of the fruits of efficiency and growth.  These are at odds with community.17  
Second, just as Cohen is agnostic when it comes to the feasibility of socialism (equality plus 
community) sans markets, (p. 76) I think he should feel the same way about the possibility of 
socialism with markets, considering the as-yet-unknown limit to market’s flexibility. 
Third, in a community any distributive policy should be supported by an argument that 
could serve as its justification “when uttered by any member [of that community] to any other 
member.”18  When a policy does not pass this “interpersonal test,” someone might still benefit 
from it by not participating in that justificatory practice.  Cohen deploys this test in order to 
show that in a Rawlsian “just society,” when a talented person demands incentives that do not 
reflect a special labor burden as a condition to work at a reasonable level (comparable to 
untalented counterparts), he would not be able to justify his move to the untalented group.  
(Policy-makers, on the other hand, may be able to justify his maneuver to the untalented, in 
terms of the maximin considerations, and their giving the talented person the proposed 
incentives might be a legitimate policy.)  His demand would testify to the absence of a 
communal tie between himself and other parties. 
Finally, a community is partly defined by its ethos, “the set of sentiments and attitudes in 
virtue of which its normal practices, and informal pressures, are what they are.”19  The diverse 
forms of community and varying degrees of communal solidarity result largely from the broad 
spectrum of such an ethos.  Some social theories prize deep emotional bonds, ideological 
cohesion, and the sense of belonging that gives persons their identity.  Cohenian community 
need not be grounded on this (communitarian) form of relationship.  Cohenian community 
exists when its ethos comprises motivational and evaluative structures of its members that 
specifically inform their sense of what is desirable, valuable, and bearable in matters of 
distributive justice.  (This does not mean that communities with thicker ethos cannot be 
Cohenian communities.)  In particular, I think that Cohen’s egalitarian ethos plays three roles: 
                                                     
16 See also Cohen (1994, 217-20). 
17 Arneson argues that there is no necessary connection between a (capitalist) market economy and any particular 
form of reciprocity.  Thus, Cohenian communal reciprocity (rather than “market reciprocity”) can be embedded in 
a market economy.  See Arneson (2111b, 252ff).  Actually, Cohen entertains this possibility: “a more ultimate 
motive [of performing market activity] can be to use a market gains philanthropically” (earlier article version of 2001, 
76, n19).  However, he goes on to say: while egoistic self-centered welfare motive is “not essential to marketeering, 
it is, of course, as matter of contingent fact, the dominant form of welfare served by the market” (emphasis added). 
18 Cohen (2008, 42). 
19 Cohen (2000, 145); see also Cohen (2008, 16-17, 73, and 123). 
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First, it facilitates luck egalitarian compensation and equality of individuals in the same 
desert-class.  People with an egalitarian ethos should be able to accept equality according to 
prudential effort with ease and without grudge.  Particularly, the talented would not demand 
unjustifiable incentives.  Second, an egalitarian ethos guides productivity and career choice.  It 
does not mandate a maximum possible level of production in a most arduous occupation.  The 
Cohenian ethos will provide the motivation to work at the level that is necessary for community 
and helps it to flourish.  And finally, this ethos would make people endorse the alleviation of 
inequalities among different desert-classes up to a degree that is compatible with the subsistence 
of the community.  This means that the talented would be willing to contribute part of their 
(luck egalitarianism-deserved) share to the lower desert-classes. 
Now, some might argue that the first aspect of the Cohenian ethos, which promotes luck 
egalitarian compensation within each desert-class, is not in harmony with the last two aspects, 
whose role is to preserve the gaps between different desert-classes within the bounds of 
community (yet at a reasonably high level).  Patrick Tomlin rightly points out:  
 
while citizens motivated by the luck egalitarian principle will reject 
inequality-generating incentives (as they will not wish to exploit their 
luck-derived talent) they need not be moved by any of the productive 
requirements to exercise their talents in the way recommended by the ‘wide ethos’ 
that Cohen appears to affirm20 (emphasis added).   
 
From this observation, Tomlin derives the “incompatibility” of luck egalitarian compensation 
and the productive requirement implied by a Cohenian ethos.  According to his diagnosis of 
this internal incongruity of Cohen’s view, the culprit is the latter’s identification of distributive 
justice with the consideration of purely comparative fairness, that is, luck egalitarian 
compensation.  He argues that we need to bring something like Pareto consideration, together 
with equality, into the concept of distributive justice.  This will take care of the leveling-down 
objection to the pure relational equality version of justice.21 
I think that Tomlin detects significant unfinished business in the luck egalitarian project, 
but arrives at the wrong diagnosis and solution.  First, although a strictly luck egalitarian ethos 
need not entail productive requirements, this does not show that they are “incompatible” with 
each other in any conceptual or empirical sense.  The absence of a necessary connection 
between the two parts of the Cohenian ethos does not mean that they cannot be parts of a 
coherent theory or, as a matter of human psychology, they cannot both reside within people’s 
motivational system.  (Furthermore, as we will see shortly, they may be reinforcing each other.)  
Second, the (‘wide’) ethos certainly would give (talented) people an urge to work hard up to a 
certain degree, but this demand and people’s commitment to it need not reflect welfare or Pareto 
                                                     
20 Tomlin (2010, 237-38). 
21 Ibid., pp. 234, 240ff. 
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considerations.  Cohen’s distinct concern is to sustain and strengthen community, and the 
productive part of his ethos is intended to furnish this need.  Indeed, the leveling-down 
objection should be a cause for anxiety among luck egalitarians, and, at some point, welfare or 
Pareto considerations need to be introduced in order to address that objection.  This becomes a 
basis for Cohenian pluralism regarding distributive ideals.  However, there are some conceptual 
and normative costs incurred in the incorporation of welfare/Pareto as part of the concept of 
justice.  (For this see the next section.)  In any case, the main purpose of the productive 
component of the Cohenian ethos is not welfare-boosting itself, but community support (and 
possibly need satisfaction as well).  Tomlin’s discussion of the internal structure of Cohen’s view 
of distributive justice highlights the above-mentioned conundrum plaguing luck egalitarianism: 
the fact that its choice of reward principle is not uniquely dictated by its commitment to 
egalitarian compensation.   
 
2.4 The community principle, equality, and the scope of justice 
Cohen’s proposal regarding the problem of reward, that is, the problem of how to handle 
the gaps among individuals exerting differential prudential effort, is that those gaps should be 
confined to such a range that helps to keep the community intact and, hopefully, thriving.  As 
we will see shortly, some egalitarian policies and practices can affect the communal character and 
depth of a society, but community-building is a complex and multi-layered causal process.  
Thus, the community reward principle will be invoked and operate with ease where communal 
bonds are already entrenched in a group of appropriate size.  However, “communal networks” 
can in principle be universal; they are dependent on “a spirit of communal reciprocity that 
encompasses us all,” not entirely on direct emotional, geological or cultural interactions. (p. 44)22 
What could be the basis of Cohen’s assertion (quoted at the end of 2.2) about the mutual 
support of community and equality?  On the one hand, many people point out that community 
or fraternity is one of the values that ground equality.23  Equality is valuable partly because it 
tends to foster community.  This is a normative claim, but it also strongly suggests a causal 
presumption that a stable community is possible when something like luck egalitarian 
compensation is firmly incorporated as part of its policies and settled down in expectations of its 
members.  When prudential luck egalitarian compensation obtains, unfortunate circumstances 
are not (to be seen as) the source of chronic disadvantage in life prospects, and people will know 
that their voluntary effort and work-leisure choices are the only legitimate ground for an 
outcome-gap.  This awareness, together with other psychological and objective factors 
                                                     
22 Hence, the community reward principle should not be understood as signaling what Arneson calls a “social 
interactionist view” in distribution, according to which equality or fairness matters “only among fellow members of 
a community who are bound together by significant social interaction.” See Arneson (2011a, 47).  Furthermore, 
together with Arneson, I believe that egalitarian compensation must be honored within the widest scope possible, 
beyond the bounds of communities. 
23 For example, see Miller (1982, 83-85). 
163
 CHOO: Equality, Community and the Scope of Distributive Justice 
 
  
conducive to solidarity, facilitates community-building and reinforces stability.  Thus, 
community partly relies upon luck egalitarian compensation.   
On the other hand, given Cohen’s characterizations of communal caring, justification, 
and ethos, it is hard to deny that community is a fertile ground in its own right for egalitarian 
distribution.  It offers the possibility of a consensus on luck egalitarian compensatory policies.  
Also, when a community functions reasonably well, it can play the role of a reward principle by 
permitting only such differential rewards (for different effort-classes) as are acceptable to the 
justificatory practice and ethos of its members.  In this way, community -- unlike utilitarian or 
libertarian reward principles -- would not sanction ever-increasing and unwieldy differential 
rewards; instead, it places principled constraints on them.  For these reasons, I believe that the 
community principle bears a closer affinity with prudential luck egalitarian compensation than 
other candidates that we have considered.  
Some people maintain that luck egalitarian compensation (which Cohen often calls 
socialist equality of opportunity) and the community principle are in “conflict,” in that the luck 
egalitarian principle should sometimes “give way” for the sake of community.24  Cohen’s way of 
describing their relationship seems to lend credibility to this view.  He says: “The community 
principle constrains the operation of the egalitarian principle by forbidding certain inequalities 
that the egalitarian principle permits”; the prudential luck egalitarianism must be “tempered” by 
the community principle; the latter “curbs” some of the inequalities that result from the former 
(pp. 12, 34, 35; Emphases added).  I am not sure whether A contradicts or even puts constraints 
on B, simply because A forbids some of what B permits.  Moreover, A’s tempering or curbing of 
B’s operation does not exactly signal a relationship of conflict or contradiction.  A serious 
conflict between A and B only arises when A forbids what B demands.  However, if what we 
have seen earlier about there not being an “absolute” share (for each level of prudential effort) or 
a “natural” proportionality (between effort and reward) is on the right track, the relationship 
between the community reward principle and luck egalitarian compensation cannot constitute a 
conflict of this type.  Since the ideal of luck egalitarian compensation aspires to equality within 
each effort-class, and to the ordinal structure of reward (and perhaps very rough proportionality) 
among different effort-classes, it leaves open the exact degree of outcome-gap that would exist 
between effort-classes.  Thus, what the community reward principle does in the way of 
preserving and promoting community — by adjusting the distance in reward among 
effort-classes — cannot “contradict” or “constrain” luck egalitarian compensation in the proper 
sense, if it does not undermine the ordinal structure of reward.  Indeed, I assume that the 
community principle shall not violate this ordinality of reward (on an extensive scale), because 
that would have the effect of doing damage to the community.  Community tends to be 
undermined when its members cannot have the legitimate expectation of reward based on their 
voluntary level of prudential effort, and regularly witness cases in which their prudential efforts 
                                                     
24 Miller (2010, 249).  See also Gilabert’s discussion of whether the community principle “constrains or 
contradicts” egalitarian justice, in Gilabert (2012, 106-7). 
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meet with disproportional rewards.  The only sense of “conflict” that appears to be present when 
the community principle is operative comes from occasions when individuals exerting different 
degrees of prudential efforts receive the same share.  Luck egalitarianism demands some 
distance in reward, but community requires equality.  I believe that sometimes, 
community-oriented concerns will lead to requirement for equality of this type.  How extensive 
this requirement, and how long it will remain in effect, depends on the type of community and 
the urgency of maintaining it.  I only assume that the community principle would not cause 
large portions of luck-egalitarianism-sanctioned distance in reward to collapse to zero; in most 
cases, narrowing the gap would be sufficient to meet the community’s concerns. 
The final issue I would like to discuss concerning Cohen’s community reward principle 
is whether it should be part of a theory of distributive justice.  At times, Cohen entertains the 
view that justice has many (interpersonal and non-interpersonal) components.  But this is 
simply for the sake of argument, and an effort to deal with the leveling-down objection to 
equality.25  His official position seems to be that “justice is (some kind of) equality,” and the 
kind in question is fleshed out with luck egalitarian compensation and respect (of some kind) for 
voluntary choice in reward.  Cohen’s conviction about distributive justice is the following: “In 
unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on 
the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust, and 
that nothing can remove that particular injustice.”26  So, justice is a matter of comparative 
fairness, and luck-neutralization and equality within each effort-class fit the bill on this count.  
On this view, deciding on a particular reward principle, such as the community principle, 
appears to be a consideration that lies outside justice.  Even in many places in Why Not 
Socialism?, where Cohen discusses community as his favorite reward principle, his underlying 
                                                     
25 Cohen (2008, 322-23). 
26 Ibid. P. 30, fn7 and 7.  Apparently, Cohen’s view on distributive justice has changed over the course of his 
engagement with Rawls.  In an earlier article, Cohen says: “for my part, I accept the difference principle…, but I 
question its application in defense of special money incentives to talented people.” See Cohen (1992, 336); see also 
Cohen (2000, 124).  However, as of the time of his last writings, his mission was to rescue justice and equality from 
the Rawlsian view.  Now, he still accepts the difference principle, but not “as a principle of justice, but rather as a 
principle of intelligent policy” (Cohen 2008, 30, fn.7).  Whenever a halfway concession (to Rawls and the difference 
principle) is made by early Cohen, however, one also has a glimmer of suspicion that he does not speak entirely from 
the heart.  However one interprets its nature, Cohen’s change of outlook on Rawls (and his considered view of 
justice) is, I think, most lucidly depicted by the following remark: 
 
I agree that the priority view contradicts my views on equality.  When I wrote ‘incentives,’ my 
view was indeed prioritarian, or rather, extreme prioritarianism, which the difference principle 
view is.  But I think that was wrong.  I should have said that justice IS equality, because that's 
what I believe.  All the rest is a concession to strict infeasibility on the one hand and human 
moral weakness on the other.  The right policy is maximin, whatever the circumstances, but to 
the extent that maximin deviates from equality, to that extent maximin, and, therefore, the right 
policy, deviates from justice. (G.A. Cohen, private e-mail to the present writer, 30 December, 
2004.) 
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assumption is an identification of justice with luck egalitarian compensation, and he continues to 
treat justice and community as separate concerns (pp. 13, 34, 80-81).  Nevertheless, in the end, 
he is non-committal about the relationship between justice and community: “But is it an injustice 
to forbid the transactions that generate those inequalities?  Do the relevant prohibitions merely 
define the terms within which justice will operate, or do they sometimes (justifiably?) contradict 
justice?  I do not know the answer to that question.” (p. 37)27 
Together with some commentators, I am inclined to the view that the community 
reward principle, or any other principle that combines (best) with luck egalitarianism, should be 
a constituent of distributive justice in the Cohenian sense.28  I can give four related reasons for 
this inclusive view.  First, Cohen’s equality-centered view of justice is usually invoked in the 
context of his having grave misgivings about non-comparative values like welfare or Pareto 
optimality intruding into the territory of justice, and imposing compromises on the comparative 
nature of justice.  However, the community principle, while incorporating welfare concerns to 
some extent, does not exclusively or centrally comprise non-comparative norms such as welfare 
maximization, maximin, or Pareto efficiency.  (Communities can prosper or wither at various 
welfare or maximin levels.)  Rather, it relevantly concerns itself with comparative (civil and 
economic) positions of individuals and their multi-layered relationship that are compatible with 
community.  Second, as we have seen earlier, the community principle need not be in essential 
conflict with the luck egalitarian ideal of compensation.  The latter concerns equality within 
each effort-class, and commits itself to respect for effort in rewarding.  The former is about how 
to respect effort in rewarding, and deals with gaps among different effort-classes.  Barring 
widespread disregard of effort in rewarding and the collapse of gaps resulting from differential 
effort, which is unlikely under the community principle, community and luck egalitarianism can 
join forces to resist various inegalitarian norms and practices.  Since the community principle 
would mostly act to narrow the gaps among different effort-classes, community concerns are 
arguably equality concerns.  Thus, when Cohen identifies justice with “(some kind of) equality,” 
that equality can be read as luck egalitarian compensation plus community-based reduction of 
gaps in final shares.  Third, more fundamentally, distributive justice must present a principled 
way of specifying fair comparative shares of individuals.  Any one person’s share should be 
determined by the justice-related characteristics exemplified by that person and other people, 
                                                     
27 Original emphasis.  He continues in parenthesis: “(It would, of course, be a considerable pity if we had to 
conclude that community and justice were potentially incompatible moral ideals.)” 
28 Tomlin (2010, 228-47); Gilabert (2012, 101-21).  I disagree with Tomlin in that he introduces a productive ethos 
into justice as a welfare or Pareto concern, while I only focus on the productive ethos and demand at the level 
conducive to community building and stability. (Community can survive at different welfare levels, so welfare and 
Pareto concerns should still be given consideration in addition to justice understood as equality and community.  
For this pluralism of distributive ideals, see the next section.)  Gilabert cashes out the community principle in 
terms of sufficientarianism (responding to basic needs), and of political equality (securing equal political status).  
However, community (as justice-related) concerns persist beyond the minimum sufficiency level and even after 
equal political status is given to members of a community. 
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and by other considerations pertinent to mapping the difference in these characteristics to 
differential rewards.  So we need a rate of reward among different effort-classes, as well as luck 
egalitarian compensation within the same class. 
Finally, in Cohen’s view, not only do we need “just coercive rules, but also an ethos of 
justice” in order to accomplish social justice.29  As we have seen, the chief role of this ethos is to 
provide the motivational ground of luck egalitarian compensation.  The talented segment of a 
society, in particular, would not demand unjustifiable incentives when informed by this ethos, 
and with the help of the latter, equality according to prudential effort will obtain.  However, it is 
natural to conceive of a productive ethos that gives guidance to the choice concerning the level of 
production and career move, as part of the egalitarian ethos.  Cohen’s community ethos would 
lead people to contribute part of their collective effort (and its result) to reducing the gaps in final 
outcome within the bounds of the community.  Members tendency to respond to needs, and 
toward the aspiration of mutual serving, would be the measure of this ethos.  Of course, the 
compensatory part of an egalitarian ethos does not conceptually necessitate its community-based 
productive component; nevertheless, there is no incompatibility here.  Given the normative 
connection between community and equality, and a significant possibility of their mutual 
support (which I tried to pointed out earlier), this community-based productive ethos and 
reward principle are very much entitled to be a part of Cohenian justice. 
The notion of community as such, and its status as constituting a reward principle, 
should be articulated and defended much further than what I can adumbrate here.  I am not 
prepared to claim that community is the only reward principle compatible with luck 
egalitarianism.  The main message of this section is this: luck egalitarians should be aware of the 
complexities inherent in the problem of reward for effort, the difficulties surrounding the 
proportionality view, and the need to supplement compensation for luck by an additional reward 
principle.  If all of the candidates for a reward principle are on a par with respect to luck 
egalitarian compensation, then there will be a radical incompleteness within luck egalitarianism.  
However, if luck egalitarianism can adopt a reward principle that has an indirect but significant 
connection with it — a shared normative ground, and/or mutual support in theory and practice, 
etc. — then, its incompleteness can be diminished, and its egalitarian credentials strengthened. 
 
3. Cohen’s Robust Pluralism vs. All-Things-Considered Views of Distributive Justice 
 
I have argued that Cohenian justice is equality, and the latter comprises luck egalitarian 
                                                     
29 Cohen (2008, 123).  Strictly speaking, an egalitarian ethos is part of “a just society,” which is “one whose citizens 
affirm and act upon the correct principle of justice,” rather than part of “a just distribution,” which consists in “a 
certain egalitarian profile of rewards.”  See Cohen (2000, 131-32).  Cohen admits that there is a logical possibility 
of mismatch between the two (non-equality-inspired ethos producing an egalitarian distribution and vice versa), but 
surmises that it is “highly unlikely.”  He also believes that for a just society, an egalitarian ethos and a just 
distribution are both necessary. 
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compensation and community-oriented gap-reduction.  Someone might want to suggest that 
we need to bring in other ideals as well into the scope of distributive justice.  Hence comes 
various types of distributive pluralism.  There are two types of pluralism of distributive ideals, 
where those ideals include equality, from the perspective of the composition of theory.  The first 
type identifies distributive justice with equality as the reduction of an (unjustified) economic gap, 
and in choosing a final optimal policy resorts to a trade-off between equality and other ideals 
(such as welfare, efficiency, or basic needs).  Cohen’s view belongs to this group.  Theories of 
the second type identify justice with the distributive rule that is ultimately chosen as the result of 
a trade-off among distributive ideals endorsed by theorists.  I favor the first type, since to me it 
is more natural to make the judgment that the problem of distributive justice still is in existence 
or aggravated (than to say all is well in the matter of justice) when the condition of everybody, 
including the least advantaged, improves while economic polarization deepens.  With Cohen, I 
do not regard the choice between the two types of theories as a merely verbal one.  Cohen 
suggests that maintaining the distinction between a principle of justice and the legitimacy of 
policies can have implications for (future) policy change -- where to target one’s efforts when the 
situation changes -- as well as serve as a reminder to get the principle right.30  Accepting it as 
natural to make a differentiated (“nuanced”31) judgment such as “advances have been made in 
welfare and efficiency, but there has been a setback in justice implies an attitude that places more 
substantial weight on demanding the restoration of equality when future circumstantial changes 
occur. 
Hence, whether the trade-off between equality and other ideals is seen as the process in 
which justice takes account of other ideals under conflicting circumstances (i.e. as a matter of 
policy guidance) or as a problem with the internal structure of a pluralistic theory of justice (i.e. 
as a matter of the composition of the principle of justice itself), makes a practical difference.  If 
one considers the state of affairs where (unjustified) gaps keep increasing as “just” (since other 
ideals are better served), it is very likely that one’s theory of justice dispenses entirely with an 
independent pressure toward (the restoration of) equality, or retains it only in a very weak form.  
His theory tends to exemplify the all-things-considered view.  Since justice — at least in its 
conception if not in its application — cannot tolerate vague areas, this type of theory, as we will 
see shortly, would rely on a strict mechanism (such as a priority rule) to coordinate a plurality of 
ideals.  Concerns for comparative fairness and the demand for gap-reduction would lose their 
independent normative force and urgency by being integrated into that mechanism.   
Positions espousing distributive pluralism can be divided into three types, from the 
perspective of ways of adjusting different ideals.  The first type confers absolute priority to a 
particular ideal.  The second type comprises all-things-considered theories of justice, which 
bring forward an encompassing, ultimate principle giving expression to the ideals in question, or 
an algorithm assigning fixed relative weights to each of them.  Theories of the third type 
                                                     
30 Cohen (2009a, 141-42).  See also, Tomlin (2010, 243). 
31 It is Cohen’s term; see Cohen (2008, 305). 
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recognize an independent status (“a certain sovereignty”32) of each ideal, and undertake a search 
for a case-based, variable priority rule.  A hard-line view, in which a distributive ideal maintains 
absolute priority over (“trumps”) others, is not really an instance of distributive pluralism.  Of 
course, how one uses the term “pluralism” cannot, by itself, sufficiently ground a full-blown 
criticism of this view.  However, if it should be deemed a practically unwise and theoretically 
unjustifiable move to let equality trump all the other ideals, by the same token, there is no small 
burden facing a view in which (for example) Pareto concerns always trump equality. 
Three subcategories fall under all-things-considered theories of justice.  First, Rawls’s 
difference principle is supposed to encompass equality and other ideals.  Rawls says that the 
difference principle is “strictly speaking, a maximizing principle” (from the perspective of the 
least advantaged), and it is “compatible with the [Pareto] principle of efficiency” (when the 
former is fully satisfied).33  When the difference principle (plus the prior principles) is fully 
satisfied, we need not be concerned about equality, Pareto efficiency or welfare anymore.  
Second, there is a group of priority views according to which a greater weight is given to the 
per-unit increase of the condition of an individual whose absolute initial condition was at a lower 
level; here, justice is the maximization of the weighted sum of the increase in outcome.  Finally, 
some “egalitarians” would like to propose an algorithm that assigns relative weights to equality 
and welfare when evaluating distributive profiles, in such a way that allocates negative scores to 
any deviation from equality while holding the leveling-down equality in check.34  Proponents of 
all-things-considered theories would boast that their position has several merits.  First, leveling 
down equality is precluded by these theories in any circumstance.  These theories disapprove of 
it not merely as a sub-optimal policy proposal, but as failing to raise the bar of justice at all.  
Second, possessing a mechanism to coordinate a plurality of ideals is, they argue, certainly a big 
plus.  In this connection, Rawls proclaims the superiority of his position over views which strike 
“a balance by intuition,” in the absence of priority rules for weighting plural ideals against one 
another.35  Parfit announces that “[t]he Priority View… can be held as a complete moral view,” 
in contrast with other pluralist views juxtaposing several ideals as part of a more complicated 
structure.36 
I think that all-things-considered theories of justice are beset with at least three problems.  
First, contrary to appearance, the coordination problem is not sufficiently addressed by an 
independent criterion that is more fundamental than the coordinated distributive ideals.  This 
problem remains just one step removed from the final evaluation of distributive patterns.  How 
much a theorist is committed to equality as opposed to welfare reveals itself in his choice 
                                                     
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
33 Rawls (1999, 68, 69). 
34 For an example of the priority and of the algorithm type, see Arneson (2011[b], 247ff) and Christiano & Braynen 
(2008, 409ff.) respectively. 
35 Rawls (1999, 30). 
36 Parfit (2000, 103). 
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regarding the relative weight given to the unit increase of each welfare stratum in the priority 
view, or in the way he apportions numbers to gap-reduction and absolute welfare level in the 
algorithm view.  This is a controversial normative decision, and at the fundamental level one 
has to rely upon “striking a balance by intuition.”37 
Second, most all-things-considered views are motivated to some extent by efforts to 
avoid the (alleged) problem of leveling-down equality.  Thus, they assign a weight to the 
egalitarian concern in such a way that leveling-down equality is always assigned a negative 
evaluation (since it is not an improvement in any sense in terms of justice).  In the meantime, 
because of this prerequisite, their evaluation of distributive profiles often seems to be arbitrary or 
fail to embrace some (egalitarian) justice-oriented intuitions.  For example, according to the 
algorithm proposed by Christiano & Braynen, the distributive configuration of (7,3) is ranked 
“more just” than (4,4) from the perspective of a justice which they call “egalitarian.”  Yet, they 
confess that this might be “a troubling result.”38 
Finally, I think that the genuineness or robustness of the pluralistic credentials of 
all-things-considered views is rightly open to doubt.  This is related to the fact that when a 
change in distribution passes the difference principle (and Rawls’s prior principles), or achieves 
the best score (among alternatives) under the priority or algorithm views, it is automatically 
regarded as an improvement in terms of justice.  A differentiated (“nuanced”) judgment 
indicating pluses and minuses for each distributive ideal is not considered pertinent here.  The 
aggravation of any ideal can go unnoticed.39  The desire for a formula, and to successfully avoid 
leveling-down equality, overrides the pluralistic mandate to give each ideal an independent status 
and voice. 
Of course, it cannot be denied that what I think of as a robust pluralism -- the view that 
equates justice with gap-reduction and pursues a case-based coordination of justice with other 
ideals -- is facing many challenges.  I am not prepared to advance a detailed outlook with 
respect to such coordination.  I just point out some of its main features.  First, in robust 
pluralism, each ideal maintains an independent and non-subordinate normative status.  Second 
and relatedly, each ideal stands for a pro tanto value in that its advancement represents an 
improvement in distribution when considered in isolation, that is, when other ideals are equally 
satisfied.  Finally, robust pluralism rejects an absolute priority that allows a particular ideal to 
                                                     
37 In Rawls’s all-things-considered view, as we have seen in the previous section, equality as gap-reduction is 
essentially a job for the prior principles.  Strictly speaking, the difference principle does not reflect the result of a 
trade-off between equality and welfare or efficiency.  It represents what Rawlsian reciprocity demands, namely, 
what reasonable and cooperative citizens interested in basic liberties and autonomy would accept as fair distribution. 
38 Christiano & Braynen (2008, 417). 
39 When the condition of the least advantaged is the same (and when the prior principles are met to the relevantly 
same degree), distributive justice in the Rawlsian sense is served in the same way, regardless of the gap between the 
highest and the least advantaged groups.  In prioritarianism, distributive justice might signal indifference between 
small welfare (boost) given to a lower group and greater welfare for a higher group, since the greater weight of 
welfare attributed to the former is cancelled out by the bigger size of welfare enjoyed by the latter. 
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“trump” others.  Accordingly, it acknowledges that there are cases where (for example) one of 
equality and Pareto efficiency defeats the other.  (When the exacerbation of economic 
inequality is pronounced and totally unjustified, or when this inequality symbolizes and 
reinforces political and civil inequalities, leveling-down economic equality is sometimes 
acceptable in robust pluralism as the optimal policy.)  Robust pluralism can be egalitarian in 
theory and practice, not because it accords absolute priority to equality, but because it recognizes 
a pro tanto and the intrinsic value of equality and its exercising of independent pressure, and 
because it underlines and promotes the many ways in which equality is integrated with – and 
mutually supports – other ideals.40 
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